The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace Americaas the Global Superpower, by Michael Pillsbury by Waldron, Arthur
Naval War College Review
Volume 68
Number 3 Summer Article 11
2015
The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret
Strategy to Replace Americaas the Global
Superpower, by Michael Pillsbury
Arthur Waldron
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Waldron, Arthur (2015) "The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace Americaas the Global Superpower, by
Michael Pillsbury," Naval War College Review: Vol. 68 : No. 3 , Article 11.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/11
BOOK REVIEWS
A BIT OF A MAVERICK
Pillsbury, Michael� The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the 
Global Superpower� New York: Henry Holt, 2015� 319pp� $30 
The Hundred-Year Marathon is the 
culmination of a lifetime’s work on 
Chinese security policy by Dr� Michael 
Pillsbury (1945–), an independent 
China analyst based in Washington, 
D�C� The book is popular, not academic� 
That said, it is by and large accurate 
and must be read and digested� 
At the outset, though, two issues must be 
raised� One is the title� The other is the 
author� The title suggests, with no evi-
dence, that somehow a secret Masonic 
cabal has existed in China for a century, 
having as its purpose the overthrow 
of the United States as leading world 
power� Taken literally that would mean 
planning got under way in 1915, under 
President Yuan Shikai, continued during 
Chiang Kai-shek’s watch, and then on 
through Mao Zedong and beyond—
which, bluntly put, is not history at all, 
but classic tinfoil-hat conspiracy theory� 
China’s changing international behavior 
over the last century is indeed difficult 
to explain, but it is most certainly not 
the product of some arcane “Protocols 
for the Replacement of America�” 
As for Pillsbury, he is well-trained, hard-
working, and independently wealthy� 
He is the author of original and defini-
tive books about the People’s Liberation 
Army� He is also a bit of a maverick: a 
one-man show, rarely part of a team� 
Long a proponent of pro-China policies, 
including sale of weapons to Beijing in 
the 1980s and 1990s, he has, as he tells 
it, changed his mind as he has learned 
more� While a “panda hugger” he was 
well treated and given much “access”—
which means access to people whose job 
is to deceive you, as well as hospitality� 
In 2006, however, he published an article 
in the Wall Street Journal decisively 
repudiating his previous views—and felt 
the back of Beijing’s hand until 2013� 
Then he was able to return to China, 
as Beijing sought to shore up support, 
faced with the South China Sea crisis, 
to be discussed below (pages 129–30)�
Pillsbury is not to be believed without 
question� He has had numerous run-
ins with counterintelligence officials 
owing to his seemingly uncontrol-
lable proclivity to leak secrets—to this 
reviewer, for example, in the passenger 
seat of his vintage Jaguar motorcar� 
Here, however, we are reviewing neither 
the sales strategy nor the author of 
this book, but rather its argument� 
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BOOK REVIEWS
A BIT OF A MAVERICK
Pillsbury, Michael� The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the 
Global Superpower� New York: Henry Holt, 2015� 319pp� $30 
The book makes two fundamental 
contentions� First, Pillsbury states 
that the Asian region and the United 
States currently face the problem of 
an unexpectedly aggressive China� 
Second, he argues that this unpleasant 
surprise is no more than the product 
of decades of official self-delusion 
about Beijing, even when confronted 
with mountains of facts that supported 
opposite conclusions� This reviewer 
agrees with these two points, albeit with 
many academic caveats that will be 
spared� Disagreement arises only when 
speculation begins about the future�
For roughly forty years, from the Nixon 
diplomacy of the 1970s to about 2010, 
the idea that China could pose a threat 
militarily was considered so mistaken 
as to be effectively beyond toleration 
in either academic or governmental 
circles� The insistent conviction was that 
“engagement” would transform China 
into a strong economy, a friend, even an 
ally, and most likely a democracy as well 
(page 7)� Among the few in Washington 
not convinced by these arguments was 
the longtime head of the Pentagon’s 
Office of Net Assessment, Andrew Mar-
shall, who did much to support Pills-
bury’s work through contract research�
China is of course a new country� The 
first states having that word as part of 
their official names were founded in 
the last century: the Republic of China 
in 1911; then after the Chinese civil 
war, the People’s Republic of China in 
1949� Before that a myriad of states, 
some ethnically Chinese, some not, 
rose and fell on the East Asian plain� 
To lump them all together as a politi-
cal “China” to be treated as a histori-
cal entity having thousands of years of 
history is a profound error, as specialists 
now recognize� Still, the continuity of a 
distinct culture belonging to the Chinese 
people must not be underestimated�
If one were to undertake a compre-
hensive study of the view of force 
within this cultural tradition, the first 
consideration would be the extreme 
pacifism expressed in the classics of 
Confucianism, created two millennia 
in the past, and long official orthodoxy� 
The mainstream of Chinese thought—
not a pretense but a conviction—sees 
superior virtue and civilization as the 
way to genuine power, as is testified 
by the vast corpus of classical writings, 
memorized by scholars for generations 
and not forgotten today, as well as the 
volumes of official memorandums on 
foreign policy, in which opposition to 
force is regularly the winning argument�
Pillsbury, however, makes no claim to be 
writing about “China” in general or even 
broadly about today’s People’s Republic� 
He says little about Confucianism be-
cause others have said much, and focus-
es instead on the all-but-forbidden tradi-
tion of writers on military topics, the 
bingjia whose heyday was also two mil-
lennia ago, but whose influence has con-
tinued, like an underground stream, ever 
since, to emerge today in what Pillsbury 
calls “the Chinese hawks,” or yingpai� 
Seemingly overlooked by official Ameri-
can estimates, these hawks have no truck 
with engagement, are deeply antiforeign 
and anti-American, and seek Chinese 
hegemony to be achieved through 
deception, strategic dominance, and the 
use of particularly effective weapons 
usually called in English, rather awk-
wardly, “assassins’ maces” (shashoujian)�  
They do not lack influence� 
Pillsbury has come to know and un-
derstand this group by employing the 
most elementary but often neglected 
methods of information gathering: 
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namely, reading their work and having 
long conversations with them (he speaks 
excellent Chinese)� The results of years 
of such research, by Pillsbury and others, 
effectively upend the conventional wis-
dom of nearly half a century� The ques-
tions that follow are: First, how did we 
go wrong? And second, what to do now?
To answer the first question, “what went 
wrong,” requires going back to President 
Richard Nixon and his national security 
adviser, Henry Kissinger� That China 
would reenter the international system 
was long a near certainty in their time� 
Maoism was beginning to be recognized 
internally as having been an unmitigated 
catastrophe, not only for the Chinese 
people, but also for the military—though 
many foreigners still idolized the man� 
The Soviet Union moreover presented 
China with a threat requiring a coun-
terweight� The only question was how 
exactly China would return� Sadly, these 
two Americans devised an utterly unre-
alistic plan that set our diplomacy on a 
course that, unsurprisingly, has brought 
unexpected and baleful consequences�
Nixon and Kissinger seem to have 
imagined a future in which an intimate 
Beijing–Washington political axis would 
supersede the entire then-existing 
security system in Asia� Such a vision 
seems the only possible explanation 
for Nixon’s quite astonishing question 
to Mao when they met on 21 Febru-
ary 1972: “Is it better for Japan to be 
neutral, totally defenseless, or it is [sic] 
better for a time for Japan to have some 
relations with the United States? The 
point being—I am talking now in the 
realm of philosophy—in international 
relations there are no good choices�” 
Put bluntly, Nixon seems already to 
have decided, long before the meeting, 
to drop relations with Japan, then our 
closest ally, in favor of China� (Japan 
was of course kept in the dark�) But 
Mao was bored and somnolent as the 
two leaders spoke� Neither he nor any 
other Chinese ever took up this offer� 
How could so unrealistic an Ameri-
can policy plan have come into being? 
The answer is by wishful thinking and 
self-deception: in this case, aided by the 
rigorously selective limitation of sources 
to those that supported the policy 
already adopted� Only a tiny secret 
team knew of the plan� The books they 
read were uniformly from the strongly 
pro-Mao school of writing then current 
(Kissinger, White House Years [Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1979], p� 1051)� Other 
books, many by better scholars, existed 
but were not consulted� Likewise, the 
speaker invited to the White House to 
enlighten the Americans was the erratic 
Frenchman André Malraux� Others 
were incomparably more knowledge-
able and available—to name but two, 
the American Foreign Service officer 
Edward E� Rice and the Berlin profes-
sor Jürgen Domes—but they were not 
even contacted� Thus, information that 
had been intentionally biased formed 
the deepest foundation for our policy� 
But the longed-for axis between Beijing 
and Washington never came into be-
ing� Quite the opposite happened�
Starting in the first decade of this 
century, with now-retired leaders hold-
ing the reins, China openly changed 
its visible foreign policy to danger-
ous military adventurism, for reasons 
no one can explain� The change has 
not succeeded� Thus the conquest of 
Scarborough Shoal undertaken in spring 
2012, which Beijing no doubt expected 
to be a military cakewalk against the 
Filipinos, has turned into a military 
and diplomatic standoff, drawing in 
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more players, losing China prestige, and 
showing no sign of ending (page 203)�
It is as yet unclear that continuing  
irresponsible expansion will be the 
gravamen of President Xi Jinping’s 
foreign policy� China’s current leader 
took power in November 2012 
months after the Scarborough Shoal 
standoff began and while he has not 
repudiated the policy he seems far 
more intent on domestic reform�
China could even liberalize: recently 
the down-market and often xenophobic 
Beijing tabloid Global Times attacked 
Western “pro-China” scholars for 
insulting that country by explaining 
away repression as the only answer to 
otherwise inevitable chaos� “Western 
scholars have never imagined that 
China might have a ‘peaceful demo-
cratic transition,’” the tabloid observed 
(8 March 2015)� These astonishing 
words did not appear by accident: the 
Global Times is wholly owned by the 
party’s most authoritative mouthpiece, 
the People’s Daily. Xi must be aware that 
even small external distractions will 
almost certainly derail domestic reform� 
As for what the rest of the world should 
do, obviously it is time to prepare: to 
rearm and deter seriously� The region, 
however, is responding so robustly 
to Chinese aggression that Beijing is 
alarmed� Japan today is not a mighty 
power only because it chose to try 
peace instead� Let no one doubt that if 
Tokyo deems it necessary, it will emerge 
again—indeed that is its current  
direction—which would be perhaps the 
greatest imaginable setback possible 
for the Chinese political and economic 
future� Nearly every other state in 
Asia too, from India to the Philippines 
and beyond, is rapidly and effectively 
preparing military capabilities that 
could present China with a nightmare 
scenario in which it is at war with a 
multiplicity of capable adversaries 
along a front of more than four thou-
sand miles, from India to Tokyo� 
Pillsbury speaks of the risk of prema-
turely “asking the weight of the em-
peror’s cauldrons,” or wending (page 
196), which sounds exotic� What it 
means is showing your cards too soon� 
China has in fact done just this, with the 
consequences the Chinese sages would 
have predicted: creating failure as others 
react in time� My conclusion: we will 
certainly soon see a highly militarized 
Asia; we may see some skirmishes or 
worse (though recall that the Chinese 
esteem most those victories achieved 
without fighting; they abhor long-term, 
attritional war), but we most emphati-
cally will not see Chinese hegemony, 
either in the region or in the world�
ARTHUR WALDRON
Morris, David J� The Evil Hours: A Biography of 
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. New York: Hough-
ton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015� 338pp� $27
The numbers are staggering� In 2012 
the U�S� Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA) estimated that eight thousand 
veterans take their own lives every year� 
Think about that—twenty-two people 
die every day of whom many, in pain 
and having lost hope, have carried their 
war with them for far too long� For 
some it may have been recent fight-
ing in Afghanistan or Iraq; for others 
it may have been decades ago in the 
jungles of Southeast Asia� Regardless, 
the trauma these people experienced 
knows no boundaries between deserts 
and mountains, between marshes and 
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